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USING EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION TO PROSECUTE
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF WAR:
LOOKING BEYOND THE
WAR CRIMES ACT
Abstract: After September 11, 2001, additions and modifications to fed-
eral law placed renewed focus on the ability of the government to prose-
cute American citizens for extraterritorial misconduct that violates the law
of war. This Note argues that federal laws, in their totality, provide the
ability to prosecute American citizens who violate the law of war while
outside the territorial limits of the United States. Although the scope of
prosecutable offenses under the War Crimes Act is limited, other federal
laws present prosecutors with multiple options for bringing an American
citizen to justice in either a federal court or military court-mardal for a
violation of the law of war. The cases of United States v. Passam and United
Stales v. Green demonstrate that Americans who violate the law of war can
be, and have been, prosecuted by using means other than the War Crimes
Act. This Note highlights deficiencies, however, in federal laws that create
circumstances where immunity from prosecution exists for certain as-
saults that violate the law of war. The Note then concludes with recom-
mendations for congressional action to change federal law and the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice to fix existing deficiencies and strengthen
the ability of the U.S. government to hold American citizens accountable
for extraterritorial misconduct that violates the law of war.
INTRODUCTION
At a military base in the Kunar Province of Afghanistan in the
summer of 2003, David Passaro, an American citizen' working on be-
half of the Central Intelligence Agency (the "CIA"), beat Abdul Wali
using his hands, feet, and a large flashlight over the course of two
1 For the purposes of Ibis Note, the term "American citizen" refers to a national of the
United States as defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (22)
(2000) ("The term 'national of the United States' means (A) a citizen of the United States,
or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance
to the United States.").
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clays. 2 When Wall died on the fourth day of captivity as a result of his
"interrogation," Passaro was not prosecuted in an Afghani court of law
or military court-martial, but rather was brought to the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to face federal crimi-
nal assault charges. 3 More than three years later, he was found guilty
and subsequently sentenced to eight years and four months' impris-
onment. 4
The case of David Passaro represents the first indictment and
prosecution of an American citizen for crimes committed abroad as
part of the Global War on Terrorism. 5 Passaro was charged with assault
using one of the federal statutes that provide for jurisdiction to prose-
cute American citizens for misconduct outside the territorial bounda-
ries of the United States. 5 Cases such as his and a desire by society for
accountability for similar bad acts have led legal scholars in recent years
to examine the body of law that provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction
to prosecute American citizens who violate the law of war. 7
2 Indictment at I, United States v. Passaro, No. 5:04-CR-211-1 (E.D.N.C. June 17, 2004)
[hereinafter Indictment, Passaro].
3 See id. at 2-4.
Nation in Brief WASH. Pos'r, Feb. 14, 2007, at A10; Josh White & Dafna Linzer, Ex-
Contractor Guilty of Assaulting Detainee, WASH, PosT, Aug. 18, 2006, at A8.
5 White & Linzer, supra note 4.
6 Indictment, Passaro, supra note 2, at 2-4.
7 See generally Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Chal-
lenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 989 (2005) (citing ambi-
guity in procedures for prosecuting military contractors); William C. Peters, On Law, Wars,
and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in
Iraq, 2006 BYU L. REV. 367 (arguing for military court-martial jurisdiction over civilian
contractors); John Sifton, United States Military and Central Intelligence Agency Personnel
Abroad: Plugging the Prosecutorial Gaps, 43 HARV. J. ON Lsnrs. 487 (2006) (arguing that sys-
temic problems with federal law and criminal defenses hinder efforts at accountability for
detainee abuse cases); Frederick A. Stein, Have We Closed the. Barn Door Yet! A Look at the
Current Loopholes in the. Military Extraterritorial jurisdiction Act, 27 Haus. J. Bret, L. 579
(2005) (examining in detail the Military Extraterritorial jurisdiction Act of 2000); Kateryna
L. Rakowsky, Note, Military Contractors and Civil Liability: Use of the Government Contractor
Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 365
(2006) (evaluating methods of holding civilian contractors accountable for misconduct
through private tort actions); Christopher C. Burris, Time fur Congressional Action: The Neces-
sity of Delineating the Jurisdictional Responsibilities of Federal District Courts, Courts -Martial, and
Military Commissions to Try Violations of the Laws of War, 2005 FED. Ors, L. Rev. 4, hap://
www.fcleorg/2005fedctslrev9.1lim (contending that jurisdictional boundaries for military
and federal courts for trying violations of the laws of war need clarification). For a discus-
sion of what constitutes a violation of the law of war, see infra notes 18-73 and accompany-
ing text.
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Although laws have been available to prosecute American citizens
for extraterritorial misconduct since 1790, 8 recent scholarly examina-
tion of the methods available to prosecute American citizens for
crimes related to violations of the law of war has identified significant
deficiencies.9 However, this examination has also exposed a variety of
federal laws that can be used by the American government to hold its
citizens accountable for crimes that violate the law of war.' 9
This Note examines whether existing law is adequate to allow for
the effective prosecution of American citizens who violate the law of
war while outside the territorial boundaries of the United States."
Part I explains how the law of war is defined in U.S. courts using cus-
tomary international law, as well as statutory definitions. 12 Part 11 ad-
dresses the basis for, and constitutional validity of, exercising extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction to try Americans for overseas misconduct. 11 Part
111 examines the federal statutes that allow the prosecution of viola-
tions of the law of war.'`' Part IV considers contemporary prosecutions
of American citizens for war crimes in U.S. federal courts. 15 Part V
analyzes the existing gap in the law that could allow an American citi-
zen to be immune from prosecution for commission of a violation of
the law of war.' 8 Lastly, Part VI makes recommendations for congres-
sional action to change federal law to close that gap and strengthen
the ability to prosecute Americans for violations of the law of war. t7
I. DEFINING VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF WAR
In seeking to define violations of the law of war, courts first look to
treaties, executive acts, legislative acts, or prior judicial decisions for
guidance. 18 When these treaties, acts, or decisions Fail to provide a
9 An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9,1 Stat.
112,112-16 (1790) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
9 See generally Minuw, supra note 7; Peters, supra note 7; Sifton, supra note 7; Stein, supra
note 7; Rakowsky, sufna note 7; Burris, supra note 7.
I" See generally Minow, supra note 7; Peters, supra note 7; Sillon, supra note 7; Stein, su-
pra note 7; Rakowsky, SUpTa note 7; Burris, supya note 7.
11 See infra notes 18-279 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 18-73 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 91-160 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 161-242 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 243-260 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 261-279 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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complete definition in any given case, courts regularly resort to cus-
tomary international law.' 9
A. Use of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts to Define
Violations of the Law of War
Generally, what constitutes a violation of the law of war is a matter
of interpretation for the courts to derive "from the 'experience of our
wars' and ... the 'laws and usages of war as understood and practiced
by the civilized nations of the worIcl.'" 20 Although there is significant
debate as to whether it is proper for U.S. courts to resort to sources of
foreign and international law to aid in interpreting issues,21 such an
approach has been affirmed for over two centuries and accepted as
part of our modern jurisprudence." As such, courts routinely resort
to what is known as customary international law to guide them in in-
terpreting what constitutes the law of war 25
As a legal term, customary international law reflects those prac-
tices and customs seen as the settled rules of international law to
which civilized nations abide." Customary international law is applied
to issues before U.S. courts whenever there is no treaty, executive act,
legislative act, or judicial decision that can provide guidance to decide
an issue in a given case. 25 But, in interpreting customary international
law as it applies to an issue, courts must consider the state of modern
affairs and how customary international law exists in the moment, not
in the past.26
Customary international law may inform courts in appropriate
cases, but it may not limit or change the exercise of constitutional law-
19 See infra notes 25, 31-56 and accompanying text.
29 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2829 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing II Op. An'y Gen. 297, 310 (1865)).
21 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("For
over two decades now, unelected federal judges have been usurping ... lawmaking power
by converting what they regard as norms of international law into American law.").
22 See id. at 729-30 (majority opinion) (citing Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); The Nereide, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815)).
29 See, e.g., Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2779-85 (plurality opinion); Hanidi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 520-21 (2004); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3t1 56, 92-96, 99-108 (2d Cir.
2003); Kadic v Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238-45 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Minis, 924
F.2d 1086, 1090-91 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
24 See Yousef 327 F.3d at 92 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694).
25 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726; Yousef, 327 F.3(1 at 92.
26 See Kadic, 70 F.3(1 at 238 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir.
1980)).
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making powers by the political branches of the U.S.. government. 27
Courts recognize that their duty is to decide issues based on "the Con-
stitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, not to conform the law
of the land to norms of customary international law." 28 When Congress
passes an act to exclude an aspect of customary international law from
the law of the land, the courts are bound to respect the exercise of that
power and apply the act instead of the relevant principle of customary
international law.29 But, if legislation is subject to multiple interpreta-
tions, the court should adopt an interpretation not in conflict with cus-
tomary international law.3°
When courts grapple with the issue of what a violation of the law of
war entails, they first seek direction in controlling treaties, executive
acts, legislative acts, or judicial decisions.m But there is no all-encom-
passing definition of the law of war in these sources. 32 Courts, there-
fore, look to a variety of additional sources of law, including customary
international law, to inform their judgment in any particular case. 33
Accordingly, courts recognize that certain forms of outrageous
conduct, such as the murder, rape, torture, or arbitrary detention of
civilians, are universally accepted as criminal violations of the law of
war, based on principles of customary international law. 34 The remain-
ing body of the law of war is shaped by treaties, statutes, decisions in
U.S. courts, and decisions in international courts. 33
Prior to and during the Second World War, the law of war was
largely defined by customary practices and international treaties, pri-
marily the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. 36 Additionally, in 1949,
27 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726; Yousef; 327 F.3(1 at 92; Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1091 (citing U.S.
CONST. art. VI).
26/ See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731; Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86, 92-93; Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1091 (citing
U.S. CONST. art. V1).
29 See Sum, 542 U.S. at 726, 731; Yousef, 327 F.3d at 93 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) at 423; United States v. Pinto-Mcjia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983)).
50 See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86, 92 (citing McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21; Murray v. The Charm-
ing Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).
51 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726; Yousef, 327 F.3d at 92 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at
700).
52 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2829-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
" See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726, 729-31; Yousef 327 F.3d at 92 (citing The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. at 700).
" See Yousef 327 F.3d at 103-08; Nadir, 70 F.3c1 at 239, 242 (citing In re Yamashita, 327
U.S. 1, 14 (1946)).
55 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2780-85 (plurality opinion); }'ousel, 327 F.3d at 92.
36 See Harndan, 126 S. Ct. at 278111.36 (plurality opinion) (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at
15-16); Nadir, 70 F.3d at 242 (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 14).
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the law of war was largely codified in four Geneva Conventions.37 Rati-
fied by the United States and more than 180 other nations, the Geneva
Conventions, along with the Hague Conventions, have come to be re-
garded by the Supreme Court and other federal courts as the major
treaties that courts should rely on in interpreting the law of war. 39
In the past, legislative acts incorporated these major treaties by
explicit reference when describing conduct that amounts to a viola-
tion of the law of war. 39 Other legislative acts dealing with violations of
the law of war implicitly incorporated the wider body of customary
international law by generally referencing the "law of war" or "law of
nations."4° In evaluating violations of the law of war, courts develop
their own definitions based on customary international law and are
naturally drawn to an examination of the Geneva and Hague Conven-
tions for guidance in their interpretation."
Prior federal court decisions also aid courts in defining the law of
war and interpreting the Geneva Conventions. 42 In the past, U.S.
courts have held that: customary international law includes the Ge-
neva Conventions signed in 1949, 43 Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions is binding upon the United States as a signatory to the
treaty," all "parties" to a conflict arc obligated to adhere to Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 45 a "party" need not be a signa-
97 Nadir, 70 F.3d at 242-43. See generally Geneva Convention (First) for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S, 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention); Geneva Con-
vention (Second) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S 85;
Geneva Convention (Third) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention); Geneva Conven-
tion (Fourth) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
38 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786, 2789, 2794-98 (majority opinion in part and plurality
opinion in part); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520; Nadir, 70 F.3d at 242-43; }'unis, 924 F.2d at 1098.
9 War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441
(West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp. IV 2007); see Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2802 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
1° Uniform Code of Military, justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 821 (West 1998 & Supp. IV 2007);
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2802 (Kennedy, j.,
concurring); Nadir, 70 F.3d at 238; Burris, nipra note 7, at
41 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786-98 (majority opinion in part and plurality opinion in
part); Kruk 70 F.3d at 238, 242-43; Burris, supra note 7, at 1V.C.i.
42 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775-94 (majority opinion in part and plurality opinion in
part); Vowel 327 F.3d at 92 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S, at 700).
43 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786, 2794 (majority opinion).
44 See id. at 2794-96; id. at 2802 (Kennedy,_)., concurring); Nadir, 70 F.3d at 242-43.
43 See Nadir, 70 F.3d at 243.
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tory to the Geneva Conventions or "even represent a legal entity ca-
pable of undertaking international obligations" to be subject to the
requirements of Common Article 3 in a conflict," the Geneva Con-
ventions extend liability For substantive violations of the law of war to
those who order their commission, 47 and the Fourth Hague Conven-
tion of 1907 imposes "command responsibility" on military command-
ers for the actions of their subordinates."
Other "international sources" also inform courts evaluating what
constitutes the law of war." These sources include the records of the
International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg, the International Crim-
inal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and other tribunals arising out
of armed conflicts. 5° Courts have looked to those experiences to evalu-
ate what charges and offenses constitute violations of the law of war. 51
Thus, under customary international law, courts look to the fol-
lowing in identifying violations of the law of war:
• Forms of outrageous conduct, such as murder or rape, univer-
sally accepted as violations of the law of war under customary in-
ternational law;52
• Major treaties, including the Geneva and Hague Conventions, ac-
cepted as codifications of the law of war under customary interna-
tional law;53
• Prior judicial decisions defining aspects of the law of war under
customary international law;54
• Customary laws and usages of war as practiced by civilized na-
tions;55 and
• Other "international sources" that can inform the courts. 56
46 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795 n.62 (majority opinion) (citing 3 	 COMM. OF RED
CROSS, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE '10 THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
OF WAR 413 (1960)); Kadic, 70 F.3c1 at 243.
47 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2781 n.36 (plurality opinion) (citing Third Geneva Con-
vention, supra note 37, art. 129; Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 15-16); Katlic, 70 F.3d at 243.
48 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2781 n.36 (plurality opinion) (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at
15-16).
49 See id. at 2784.
5° See id. at 2784-85; Katlic, 70 F.3d at 243.
51 See Harridan, 126 S. Ct. at 2784-85 (plurality opinion); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243.
52 See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 103-05; Kticlic; 70 F.3d at 239,242 (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 14).
53 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786,2794-98 (majority opinion in part and plurality opin-
ion in part); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520; Kadic, 70 F.3(1 at 242-43; nds, 924 F.2d at 1098.
5-1 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775-94 (majority opinion in part and plurality opinion in
part); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243.
55 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2829-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
56 See id. at 2784 (plurality opinion).
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B. Impact of Hamdan V. Rumsfeld and Congress's Reaction with the Military
Commissions Act of 2006
As mentioned above, Congress may nullify an aspect of custom-
ary international law by passing a controlling legislative act for that
purpose. 57 In its 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that, because Congress requires military commis-
sions to conform to the law of war, the military commissions being
conducted in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba must meet the requirement of
Common Article 3 that an unlawful combatant "be tried by a 'regu-
larly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.'"" Justice Kennedy,
in his concurring opinion, made clear that if Congress and the Bush
administration want to implement laws to guide judicial interpreta-
tion of the law of war, the U.S. Constitution has given them the power
to do so.59
The Bush administration and a Republican-controlled Congress
reacted quickly to the decision by passing a bill that established a sys-
tem of military commissions, prohibited the invoking of the Geneva
Conventions as a right in any judicial proceeding to which an agent of
the United States is a party, directed the President to interpret the
meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions to the United
States and issue regulations by Executive Order for violations that are
not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and modified the War
Crimes Act to define statutorily grave breaches of Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions. 60 On October 17, 2006, the President signed
67 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
5R See 126 S. Ct. at 2792-08 (majority opinion in part and plurality opinion in part)
(citing 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000), amended by 10 U.S.C.A. § 836 (West 1998 & Stipp. IV 2007));
id. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 82 1 (2000), amended by 10 U.S.C.A.
§ 821 (West 1998 & Supp. IV 2007); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3). After
being captured in Afghanistan, Salim Hamdan challenged the authority of a military
commission to try him in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on the grounds that neither a congres-.
sional act, nor the common law of war, authorized his trial on the charge of conspiracy. See
id. at 2759 (majority opinion). Ihundan also alleged that the procedures to be used to try
him by a military commission were illegal because they violated basic tenets of military and
international law. See id,
66 See id. at 2799-800 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6° See Military Conunissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 3-6,120 Stat. 2000,
2600-35 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp. IV
2007)); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3; Karen lleYoung, Court Mid It Lacks
Power in Detainee Cases, WASH. POST, Oct 20,2006, at A18. The bill also amended statutes
regarding the habeas corpus rights of detained persons determined to be enemy combat-
ants or awaiting such determination. See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7.
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into law the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and provided the courts
with new guidance and direction for interpreting violations of the law
of war. 61
The debate over the Military Commissions Act in the House of
Representatives provides perspective on the intent Congress had in de-
fining grave breaches of Common Article 3 and giving the President
the authority to otherwise interpret obligations under the Geneva Con-
ventions. 62 The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee,
Duncan Hunter, a Republican representative from California, ex-
plained the rationale for changing the manner in which the Geneva
Conventions should be interpreted under U.S. law:
This amendment is necessary because section C(3) of the War
Crimes Act defines a war crime as any conduct which consti-
tutes a violation of common article 3. Common article 3 pro-
hibits some actions that are universally condemned, such as
murder and torture, but it also prohibits outrages upon per-
sonal dignity and what is called humiliating and degrading
treatment, phrases which are vague and do not provide ade- -
quate guidance to our personnel.
Since violation of common article 3 is a felony under the
War Crimes Act, it is necessary to amend it to provide clarity
and certainty to the interpretation of this statute. The surest
way to achieve that clarity and certainty is to define the list of
specific offenses that constitute war crimes punishable as
grave violations of common article 3.
So what we have done is we have taken the offenses that are
considered to be grave offenses under article 3 ... and we de-
fine those as the offenses which will be applicable upon which
prosecutions can be brought, and then we give to the Presi-
dent on what I would call infractions of Geneva article 3 or
lesser violations of Geneva article 3, we give him the right to
put together regulations that account for and treat actions
that are defined under those minor offenses.63
61 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 §§ 5-6; supra notes 25-30 and accompanying
text.
62 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6; 152 CONG. REC. H7522, 7533-59 (daily ed.
Sept. 27, 2000).
65 152 CONG. REC. H7533, 7535, 7539 (statement of Rep. Hunter).
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In passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Congress ap-
peared to define by statute and regulations actions that would qualify as
violations of the law of war under the Geneva Conventions. 64 By amend-
ing the War Crimes Act to provide definitions of grave breaches of
Common Article 3, Congress created a controlling statute for interpret-
ing when such grave breaches take place. 65 Under the Military Com-
missions Act, regulations that define other violations of the Geneva
Conventions will be issued in the form of Executive Orders by the
President that "shall be authoritative (except as to grave breaches of
common Article 3) as a matter of United States law, in the same man-
lier as other administrative regulations." 66
C. Interpreting the Law of War in U.S. Courts After the Passage of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006
The Military Commissions Act revised large portions of the War
Crimes Act and directed U.S. courts to review and interpret grave
breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions in light of
the contents of § 2441 (d) of the War Crimes Act.° By additionally legis-
lating that the President shall issue Executive Orders interpreting the
remainder of the Geneva Conventions, Congress has effectively put
into place controlling legislative and executive acts that define the Ge-
neva Conventions in a way that courts may not disregard. 68
When faced in the future with a need to interpret a violation of
the law of war, courts will be informed in their judgments by the fol-
lowing:
• Statutory definitions for what constitutes a grave breach of Com-
mon Article 3; 69
64 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6; 152 CONG. REC. 1-17535 (statement of Rep.
Hunter).
65 See War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Stipp. 2006 & Stipp. IV
2007); Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art.
3; supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
66 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6, 120 Stat. 2600, 26110-
35 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Stipp. 2006 & Stipp. IV 2007)).
67 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441; Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6; Third Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 37, art. 3.
68 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6; Ifamdan,126 S. Ct. at 2799-801 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952));
supra notes '25-33 and accompanying text.
69 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441.
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• Controlling Executive Orders interpreting and promulgating
standards and administrative regulations for other violations of the
Geneva Conventions; 70
• Prior judicial decisions defining aspects of customary international
law exclusive of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, such as
the concept of "command responsibility" developed from the
Fourth Hague Convention of 1907; 71
• Customary laws and usages of war as practiced by civilized nations
that are not covered by the President's interpretations of the provi-
sions of the Geneva Conventions;72 and
• Other "international sources" that can inform the courts on issues
falling outside the President's interpretations of the provisions of
the Geneva Conventions."
II. BASIS FOR JURISDICTION IN U.S. COURTS FOR
EXTRATERRITORIAL MISCONDUCT
Even if an American citizen were to commit a crime that fit within
the definitions of the War Crimes Act, could the United States prose-
cute her for misconduct that took place outside its territory? Would
such prosecution impinge upon the right of another nation to prose-
cute crimes committed within its own borders? Generally, jurisdiction
over American citizens by use of statutes that apply extraterritorially is
proper where issues of sovereignty are addressed, Congress clearly in-
tended for a statute to apply outside the territorial boundaries of the
United States, and the extraterritorial application of a statute would not
violate due process.74
• A. Issues of Sovereignty
Until the early part of the twentieth century, the general presump-
tion was that nations had exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within
7° See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6. As of April 3,2007, the President has not
issued an Executive Order as called for by the Military Commissions Act. See The White
House, Executive Orders Issued by President George W. Bush, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/orders (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
71 See l lamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2781 n,36 (plurality opinion) (citing Third Geneva Con-
vention, supra note 37, art. 129; Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 15-16).
" See Id. at 2829-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 2784 (plurality opinion).
74 See infra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
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their borders." The idea that one nation could exercise exclusive legis-
lative jurisdiction over another, absent conquest or consent, has gener-
ally been rejected as inconsistent with the principle of sovereignty un-
der international law. 76 But, the concept that two nations may have
concurrent jurisdiction over a particular controversy is accepted, as it
presents few sovereignty issues and frequently arises in modern times. 77
Where there is consent to the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction,
nations often establish treaties that delineate how and to what extent
one nation may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction within the other's
borders. 78 Additionally, international law recognizes that the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction is appropriate where a sufficient connection
exists between the controversy in question and the nation seeking to
exercise jurisdiction, or the controversy is so outrageous as to be uni-
versally condemned, as in the case of sexual abuse of children. 79 Thus,
the United States's application of extraterritorial jurisdiction does not
infringe on the sovereign rights of a foreign nation where there is con-
sent to such exercise, the foreign nation is unable to object, there is a
sufficient connection between the controversy and the nation seeking
to exercise jurisdiction, or the controversy is so outrageous as to be uni-
versally condemned. 8°
B. Constitutional Basis: Congressional Authority and Due Process
It is not enough that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by
the United States not violate principles of international law regarding
sovereignty. 81 When a U.S. court is called upon to enforce a domestic
law beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States, the statute
sought to be applied must have been passed by a valid exercise of con-
75 See United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207,217 (2d Cir. 2000).
76 See United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166,1171 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing In re Ross, 140
U.S. 453,464 (1891)); Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 216-17.
77 See Corey, 232 F.3d at 1179.
78 See id. at 1180. Examples of consent, as seen in Corey and Gatlin, are Status of Forces
Agreements regarding jurisdiction over crimes committed by military members in coun-
tries that host American Armed Forces. See id. at 1181-83; Gatlin, 216 F.3cl at 209.
79 See United States v. Clark, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1127,1131-32 (W.D. Wash. 2004), aff'd,
435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).
86 See Corey, 232 F.3d at 1171, 1180; Clark 315 F. Stipp. 2d at 1131-32.
81 See Corey, 232 F.3d at 1170-71; Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 211-12.
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gressional power, and such application must not violate the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fifth Amendment under the U.S. Constitution. 82
Courts acknowledge congressional authority to pass laws that regu-
late conduct beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States."
But laws passed by Congress are presumed not to have extraterritorial
application absent a clearly expressed intent to the contrary." Where
Congress indicates its intent for a statute to apply extraterritorially,
courts must Follow Congress's direction unless doing so would violate
the Due Process Clause. 85
Under the Due Process Clause, a statute may not be applied extra-
territorially in an arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable manner.86 Courts
have held that due process is not violated when the government shows
a sufficient nexus between the act in question and the United States,
such that a defendant "should reasonably anticipate being hauled into
court in this country" by extraterritorial application of a statute."
U.S. courts accept five principles of international law as providing
a basis for holding that a sufficient nexus between a controversy and
the United States exists." The principles are:
(1) the objective territorial principle, under which jurisdic-
tion is asserted over acts performed outside the United States
that produce detrimental effects in the United States; (2) the
protective principle, under which jurisdiction is asserted over
foreigners for acts committed outside the United States that
may impinge on the territorial integrity, security, or political
independence of the United States; (3) the nationality princi-
ple, under which jurisdiction is based on the nationality or na-
tional character of the offender; (4) the universality principle,
which provides jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts for crimes
so heinous as to be universally condemned; and (5) the pas-
82 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; United States V. Yonsel, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2003)
(citing United States v. l'into-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983)); Gorey, 232 F.3d at
1170-71; Clark 315 F. Stipp. 2d at 1131-33.
83 See Yousel 327 F.3d at 86 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
84 See id. (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993)).
85 See U.S. CONST, amend. V; Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86 (citing Pinto-Mcjia, 720 F.2d at 259).
" See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; Clark, 315 F. Stipp. 2d at 1132 (citing United States v.
Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990)).
87 See Clark, 315 F. Stipp. 2c1 at 1132 (quoting United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144
F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998)).
88 See id. at 1131 (citing United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 840 11.5 (9th Cir.
1994)).
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sive personality principle, under which jurisdiction is based
upon the nationality of the victim."
Thus, statutes that have a basis in one of these principles, and express
an intention for application outside the territorial borders of the
United States, may be applied extraterritorially without raising constitu-
tional issues regarding congressional power or the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment."
[11. FEDERAL STATUTES ALLOWING FOR PROSECUTION OF AMERICAN
CITIZENS FOR VIOLATING TIIE LAW OF WAR
No single federal statute criminalizes all violations of the law of
war." The War Crimes Act comes close, but limits criminalization to
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 92 grave breaches of Com-
mon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as defined by statute, and cer-
tain conduct prohibited by the Hague Conventions."
In fact, a significant portion of the law of war arising out of cus-
tomary international law is not criminalized in the War Crimes Act."
Specifically, the War Crimes Act does not cover assaults not resulting
in serious bodily injury and offensive acts upon people within U.S.
custody or control not rising to the statutory definition of cruel or
inhuman treatment in § 2441(d) of the War Crimes Act. 95 Many com-
mentators argue that such selective criminalization in federal statutes
allows U.S. government personnel to perform certain acts that violate
the law of war with immunity from prosecution." At a minimum, the
99 Id.
" See U.S. Cotvsr. amend. V; l'ousej; 327 F.3ii at 86; Corey, 232 F.3d at 1170-72; Clark,
315 F. Supp. 2d at 1131-32.
g' See, e.g., Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2000
& Stipp. III 2003); Anti-Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000, Supp. III 2003 &
Supp. IV 2004); War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 &
Supp. IV 2007).
92 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441(c) (1); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 130.
95 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441. The War Crimes Act of 1996 also criminalizes certain con-
duct that violates provisions of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices. See id.
94 See id.; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3; Katlic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3(1.
232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing First Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3); supra notes
20-56 and accompanying text.
95 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3.
96 See generally Minow, supra note 7; Sifton, supra note 7; Rakowsky, supra note 7; Burris,
supra note 7.
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War Crimes Act does not reflect all offenses that would be regarded as
customary violations of the law of war.97
But, other federal criminal statutes provide the ability to charge
those offenses that are not considered criminal under the War Crimes
Act, yet violate the traditional understanding of the law of war. 98 Some
federal criminal statutes covering customary violations of the law of war,
such as those regarding sex offenses, duplicate offenses that are
chargeable as grave breaches of Common Article 3 under the War
Crimes Act. 99 The federal statutes discussed below allow for the prose-
cution of American citizens for offenses that, when committed in an
armed conflict, would violate the customary law of war and be fit for
prosecution in U.S. courts.'"
A. Statutes Extraterritorial by Declared intent
1. War Crimes Act of 1996
As discussed above, the War Crimes Act criminalizes certain con-
duct—by members of the U.S. Armed Forces or a U.S. national—that is
defined by statute as a war crime.'" Congress explicitly indicated its
intent for the statute to apply extraterritorially by making it applicable
to conduct "inside or outside the United States: 192
The extraterritorial application of the statute does not violate
due process because subjecting members of the Armed Forces or U.S.
nationals to trial in a U.S. court is not unreasonable, unfair, or arbi-
trary under the nationality principle.'" Additionally, some war crimes
are so heinous and universally condemned that the universality prin-
ciple negates any due process consideration.'"
97 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Stipp. IV 2007); Third Geneva
Convention, .supra note 37, art. 3; supra notes 20-56 and accompanying text.
98 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3; supra notes
20-56 and accompanying text; infra notes 101-160 and accompanying text.
99 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241-2244; id. § 2441; supra notes 20-56 and accompanying text.
0° See infra notes 101-160 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that the Alien
Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act provide a cause of action for civil liabil-
ity in U.S. courts for violations of aspects of customary international law. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2000). An examination of such civil liability is beyond the scope of this Note.
101 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441; supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
102 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441(a),
193 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp. IV
2007); supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
K" See U.S. CONST. amend. V; supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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2. Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 and the Anti-
Torture Statute
The Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 criminal-
izes certain conduct "with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group."°5 Con-
gress indicated its intent for the statute to apply extraterritorially by
defining two different circumstances when it shall apply. 106 In the first
circumstance, the statute applies when the offense is committed within
the United States.'° 7 The second circumstance indicates extraterritorial
application by tying applicability not to geography, but to the status of
"the alleged offender as a national of the United States." 1 °°
The Anti-Torture Statute criminalizes the commission or at-
tempted commission of torture, as well as the act of conspiring to
commit torture. 109 Congress was explicit that this act was meant to ap-
ply solely to extraterritorial action by defining the offense as one taking
place "outside the United States. "110 jurisdiction over the offense exists
where the offender is a U.S. national or the offender is present in the
United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or offender.'"
Extraterritorial application of either statute does not violate due
process because of both the nationality and universality principles.n 2
Subjecting U.S. nationals to trial for torture or genocide in a U.S. court
is not unreasonable, unfair, or arbitrary under the nationality princi-
ple.'" Subjecting those who have committed an act of torture to prose-
cution when that person is present in the United States is not unfair,
unreasonable, or arbitrary because torture is an act that is universally
condemncd. 114
1°5 Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (2000 &
Stipp. III 2003).
108 See id. § 1091(d).
107 See id. § 1091 (d)(1).
108 See id. § 1091(d) (2).
109
 See Anti-Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). See generally
David Johnston, Son of Liberies Ex-Leader Charged in Miami Under Anii -Torture Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A5 (describing the first case in which federal authorities invoked
the Anti-Torture Statute).
no See 18 U.S.C. 2340A(a).
111 See id. § 2340A(h),
112 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
115 See 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2000 & Stipp. III 2003); 18 U.S.C. § 2340A; supra notes 86-90
and accompanying text.
na See 18 U.S.C. § 2390A; supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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B. -Statutes Extending Jurisdiction to Certain Areas or Classes of People
1. Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Statute
Having evolved From its 1790 predecessor, 115 the Special Maritime
and Territorial Jurisdiction ("SMTJ") Statute extends jurisdiction, as
one court has opined, to the ends of the earth and beyond. 116 The
SMTJ Statute operates under the idea that jurisdiction over crimes or
controversies should extend to certain areas where "American citizens
and property need protection, yet no other government effectively
safeguards those interests." 117 It creates an area of special jurisdiction
that Congress may expressly apply to certain crimes by reference
when it defines the scope of territorial applicability for a statute. 118
Prior to the passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (the "USA PATRIOT Act"), the SMTJ Statute
included eight specific areas that Congress felt should be part of the
special jurisdiction of U.S. courts." 9 These areas of special jurisdiction
encompass U.S. vessels on the high seas, U.S. vessels on certain inter-
national waterways, land acquired for the use of the United States
such as military bases and embassies, and U.S. aircraft in flight. 120
The USA PATRIOT Act added a ninth area that greatly expanded
the exercise of jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against na-
tionals of the United States. 121 The added provision, § 7(9), expanded
the SMTJ of the United States to any place or residence in a foreign
state used by missions or entities of the U.S. government with respect to
offenses committed by or against a national of the United States.' 22 This
119 See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch, 9, 1
Stat. 112, 112-16 (1790) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
116 See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166,
1171 (9th Cir. 2000).
117 See 18 U.S.C, § 7; Gorey, 232 F.3d at 1171.
ll8 See 18 U.S.C. § 7.
us See id.
 (2000), amended by id. § 7(9) (Stipp. III 2003); Corry, 232 F.3d at 1171; see also
LISA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 804, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 7(9)).
12° See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000), amended by id. § 7(9) (Stipp. III 2003); Corey, 232 F.3d at
1171, 1183 (holding that an off-base residence falls within the special territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States); United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 1974) (hold-
ing that an embassy falls within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States), But
see United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 223 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that an off-base resi-
dence does not fall within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States).
121 See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 804.
122 See id,
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new area of SMTJ provides the U.S. government the ability to prosecute
offenses occurring within areas as varied as a U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development compound in a foreign country, a safe house used
for detention and interrogation by U.S. intelligence personnel, prisons
owned by a foreign nation but used for government purposes by U.S.
intelligence personnel, or an off-base residence in a foreign country
occupied by U.S. personnel assigned to that country.'"
2. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (the "MEJA") does
not extend jurisdiction to areas beyond the normal territorial borders
of the United States.'" The MEJA does, however, create status-based
jurisdiction that attaches to a person if she engages in certain conduct
while a member of the Armed Forces or while employed by or accom-
panying the Armed Forces outside the United States. 125 Any offense
that would be punishable by imprisonment. for more than one year had
the offense been committed in the SMTJ of the United States triggers
such status-based jurisdiction under the MEJA. 126
The MEJA, however, does not preempt the jurisdiction of a mili-
tary court-martial over a member of the Armed Forces.' 27 Instead, the
MEJA only allows for jurisdiction over crimes committed by a member
of the Armed Forces when that person ceases to be subject to the provi-
sions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (the "UCMJ") due to
separation from the service prior to being subject to a court-martial or
other punitive action for the offense. 128
3. Those Subject to the MEJA and 18 U.S.C. § 7(9)
In 2004, the applicability of the MEJA to contractors from a gov-
ernment agency other than the Department of Defense received a
good degree of scrutiny in the course of the investigation into the Abu
Ghraib prison scandal.' After the investigation, the definition of those
1288
	
18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 804.
124 See MEJA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
125 See id § 3261(a) (2000).
126 See id.
127 See id. § 3261.
128 See id. § 3261(d); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 434, 436, 439, 450-51 (1987)
(holding that court-martial jurisdiction is based on the accused having military status).
128 See MEJA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000), amended by id. § 3267 (Supp. IV 2004);
Ellen McCarthy & Renae Merle, Contractors and the Law, Vasil. Pos -r, Aug. 27, 2004, at El;
Renae Merle & Ellen McCarthy, 6 Employees from CACI International, Titan Referred for Prose-
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personnel covered by the MEJA, as outlined in § 3261(a) and further
defined in § 3267, was modified by the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2005 to make clear that the provisions of the MEJA
apply to non-Department of Defense federal employees or contractors
working in support of the mission of the Department of Defense over-
seas.o° The 2004 modification to the MEJA did not address the trou-
bling, limited circumstance where a person could be immune from
prosecution for a violation of the law of war if his or her offense took
place in an area defined by § 7(9) of the SMTJ Statute and the maxi-
mum punishment did not exceed one year) 31
Section 7(9) is wide in the scope of its definition of areas that are
within the SMTJ, but it is limited in application because it "does not
apply with respect to an offense committed by a person described in
[§] 326l (a) [of the MEJA]," 132 This distinction is important to note be-
cause for one to be charged using the MEJA or the SMTJ Statute for
extraterritorial misconduct that violates the law of war while having
been a member of the Armed Forces or employed in support of the
mission of the Department of Defense overseas, the offense has to carry
a sentence of more than one year, or the offense needs to have taken
place in an area defined by § 7(1)—(8). 133
ration, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at A18; Scott Shane, Some U.S. Prison Contractors May
Avoid Charges, HALT. SUN, May 24, 2004, at 1A.
133 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261(a), 3267 (2000), amended by id. § 3267 (Supp. IV 2004);
Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No.
108-375, § 1088,118 Stat. 181 1 (2004) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (Supp. IV
2004)). See generally Glenn R. Schmitt, Amending the Military Extraterritmial jurisdiction Act of
2000: Rushing to Close an Unforeseen Loophole, ARMY LAW., June 2005, at 41 (explaining his-
tory of the MEJA and subsequent amendment in 2004).
13I See 18 U.S.C. § 7(9) (Stipp,	 2003); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000 & Supp. IV
2004); supra notes 20-56 and accompanying text. For instance, the penally for an assault
by striking, beating, or wounding under the federal criminal statute is less than one year.
18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (4) (2000). A person could not be prosecuted under the MEJA for an
assault by beating upon an Iraqi civilian detained at a military base even though it would
be considered a violation of the law of war under customary international law. See id.; 18
U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267; supra notes 20-56 and accompanying text.
132 See 18 U.S.C. § 7(9); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261(a), 3267. Section 3261(a), as amended fol-
lowing Abu Ghraib, defines "employed by the Armed Forces" as including civilian employ-
ees, contractors, and employees of contractors working for the Department of Defense
overseas, as well as employees, contractors, and employees of contractors working for other
federal agencies or any provisional authority to the extent that such employment relates to
supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261(a),
3267.
133 See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267; supra notes 20-
56 and accompanying text.
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4, Constitutionally Valid Basis for jurisdiction in U.S. Courts for
Extraterritorial Misconduct Using the MEJA or the SMTJ Statute
Using either the MEJA or the SMTJ Statute to prosecute an Ameri-
can citizen for extraterritorial misconduct is constitutionally valid be-
cause both statutes clearly express Congress's intent that they apply be-
yond the territorial boundaries of the United States.'" The MEJA ex-
plicitly cites "conduct outside the United States"" 5 and the extraterrito-
rial provisions in the SMTJ Statute reference territory outside the
United States."6 Furthermore, extraterritorial application does not vio-
late due process because it is not unreasonable, unfair, or arbitrary to
subject American citizens or members of the Armed Forces to trial in a
U.S. court under the nationality principle.'"
5. Civilian Courts-Martial Under the UCMJ
When the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
was passed in October of 2006, jurisdiction of the UCMJ was modified
so that civilians accompanying the military in a declared war or contin-
gency operation, as defined by § 101(a) (13) of Title 10, may be subject
to trial by court-martial." 8 This recent modification nullifies the 1970
U.S. Court of Military Appeals holding in United States v. Averette that a
civilian accompanying the Armed Forces could only be subject to a
court-martial where there has been an express declaration of war by
Congress. 189 Building on a series of decisions since World War II deal-
ing with civilian courts-martial, Averette had further limited the historic
use of courts-martial to enforce discipline amongst civilians accompany-
ing military forces in the field. 140 As recently as 1987, in Solaria is United
111 See 18 U.S.C. § 7; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267; supra notes 81-85 and accompanying
text.
111 See MEJA, 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) (2000).
In See 18 U.S.C. § 7; Corey, 232 F.3d at 1171-72; Erdos, 474 F.2d at 160; supra notes 81-
85 and accompanying text.
117 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; United States v. Clark, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131-32
(W.I). Wash. 2004), aft, 435 F.3d I 110 (9th Cir. 2006); supra notes 86-90 and accompany-
ing text,
111 See 10 U.S.C. § 101 (a) (13) (2000); John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C.A. § 802 (West 1998 & Stipp. IV 2007)).
115 See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 § 552; 10
U.S.C.A. § 802; 41 C.M.R. 363, 365 (1970).
14° See Solaria, 483 U.S. at 436, 439, 450-51; McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 283-
84 (1960) (holding that civilian employees accompanying the military overseas in peace-
time may not be subject to civilian courts-martial for noncapital offenses); Grisham v.
Ragan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960) (holding that civilian employees accompanying the ntili-
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States, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of court-martial ju-
risdiction and held that military law could apply only to those who have
a military status."'
Because military commanders who exercise court-martial authority
have yet to use this new statutory power to court-martial a civilian, this
change in jurisdiction of the UCMJ has not been subject to application
or judicial review. 142 Nonetheless, critics have already weighed in to
suggest that the application of military law to civilians is unconstitu-
tionaI. 143 A major criticism of the change in the law is that it deprives
civilians of certain legal protections they otherwise would enjoy in fed-
eral courts, such as a right to a grand jury hearing and a right to trial by
a jury of one's peers.'" Proponents argue that the change in jurisdic-
tion enhances accountability over military contractors and that the
military justice system has sufficiently changed in the last forty years so
that the lack of constitutional protections has been ameliorated. 145
Some predict that upon being challenged, the new law will fail in
the face of Supreme Court precedent that rejects the application of
military law to civilians.'" Alternatively, one could envision the devel-
opment of a test to determine if a civilian accompanying the Armed
terry overseas may not be subject to civilian courts-martial for capital offenses); Reid v. Cov-
ert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (plurality opinion) (holding that civilian dependents accompany-
ing the military overseas may not be subject to civilian courts-martial for capital offenses);
Avereite, 41 at 365; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 202
analysis, at A21-11 (2005) [hereinafter MCM]. See generally David A. Melson, Military juris-
diction over Civilian Contractors: A Historical Overview, 52 NAVAL L. REA,. 277 (2005).
tat See 483 U.S. at 436, 439, 450-51.
"2 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 802; Griff Wine, New Law Could Subject Civilians to Military Trial,
WASII. POST, Jan. 15, 2007, at Al; Stephen Fidler & Demetri Sevastopulo, Civilian Workers
Could Face Court Martial, MSNBC.com, Jan. 10, 2007, available at lutp://wwwbc.edu/schools/
law/lawreviews/hclawreviewhtml; Peter W. Singer, Frequently Asked Questions on the UCMJ
Change and lts Applicability to Private Military Contractors, BROOFUNGS INSTITUTION, Jan. 12,
2007, http;//www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/psinger/20070112.1am [hereinafter Singer,
Frequently Asked Questions]; Peter W. Singer, The Law Catches Up to Private Militaries, Embeds,
Buooluras INSTITUTION, Jan. 4, 2007, littp://www.brookings.eduiviews/articles/psinger/
20070104.hun [hereinafter Singer, The Law Catches Up to Private Militaries].
145 See Witte, Mott note 142; Fidler & Sevastopulo, supra note 142; Singer, Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 142.
144 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 802 (West 1998 & Stipp. IV 2007); Witte, supra note 142; Fidler &
Sevastopulo, supra note 142.
"5 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 802; Witte, supra note 142; Singer, Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 142; Singer, The Law Catches up to Private Militaries, supra nom 142. See generally Peters,
.supra note 7 (arguing that sufficient due process protections presently exist for the ac-
cused within the military justice system).
146 See Solari°, 483 U.S. at 450-51; McElroy, 361 U.S. at 287; Grisham, 361 U.S. at 280;
Reid, 354 U.S. at 5; Averette, 41 C.M.R. at 365; Witte, supra note 142; Fidler & Sevastopulo,
supra note 142; Singer, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 142.
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Forces has a de facto military status such that he or she could be subject
to court-martial jurisdiction within the holding in So/orio. 147 One could
also imagine a reversal of the Court's holding in Solaria and a return to
a test of court-martial jurisdiction based on a service connection of the
offense to the Armed Forces)"
Considering the persuasive precedent and the evolution of a
means for prosecuting civilians for extraterritorial misconduct by use of
the MEJA, a finding of unconstitutionality could be likely.'" But, as one
commentator points out, "predicting what the Supreme Court may or
may not rule seems a lot like predicting the lottery. We won't know un-
til there is a test case. Until then, it's the law of the land." 15°
C. Title 18 Criminal Statutes Applying Within the SMTJ
As discussed above, a number of criminal statutes apply within the
SMTJ of the United States that qualify as violations of the law of war
under customary international law when committed against persons
not taking part in hostilities, such as civilians, detainees, or prisoners
who have laid down their arms. 151 In general, these crimes include
117 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 802; 483 U.S. at 439-40 ("The test for jurisdiction	 is one of
status, namely, whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a person who can be
regarded as falling within the term 'land and naval Forces.'" (citing Kinsella v. Singleton,
361 U.S. 234,240-41 (1960))); Reid, 354 U.S. at 22-23 ("We recognize that there might be
circumstances where a person could be 'in' the armed services for purposes of [being
considered 'in the land or naval forces'] even though he had not formally been inducted
into the military or did not wear a uniform."). Such a lest could objectively examine the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether a civilian could be seen as a member of
the Armed Forces. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 22-23. Factors to examine might include whether a
uniform is worn, whether the civilian is embedded within a military unit, whether the civil-
ian's immediate superior is a military member, and whether the responsibilities of the
civilian are inherently military activities. See id.; see also MCM, supra note 140, R.G.M. 202
analysis, at A2I-11 ("To be 'accompanying an armed force' one's presence within a mili-
tary installation must be more than merely incidental; it must be connected with or de-
pendent upon the activities of the armed forces or its personnel."). Notably, one major
security contracting firm, Blackwater USA, already argues that its overseas employees are
part of the total military force for the purposes of defending against civil claims liability.
See Brian Bennett, Outsourcing the War, TIME, Mar. 26,2007, at 40. it would be ironic if it
were to change its position to defend against the imposition of court-martial jurisdiction.
See id.
N8
	 483 U.S. at 452-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119 See MEJA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000 & Stipp. IV 2004); Witte, supra note 142;
Fidler & Sevastoptdo, supra note 142; Singer, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 142;
Singer, The Law Catches Up to Private Militaries, supra note 142; supra notes 138-141 and
accompanying text.
150 Singer, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 142.
151 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, arts. 3-4; supra notes 98-100 and ac-
companying text.
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murder, 152 manslaughter,'" attempts to commit murder or manslaugh-
ter, 154 conspiracy to murder,' 55 assault,' 56 and maiming.'" Other crimes
may be applicable depending upon the conduct involved in a violation
of the law of war under customary international law. 158
All the above listed crimes apply extraterritorially by operation of
the language that extends applicability beyond the normal territorial
borders of the United States to the SMTJ. 159 As also discussed above,
the use of these statutes under the SIVITJ Statute or the MEJA to apply
extraterritorial jurisdiction to an American citizen does not violate due
process based on the nationality principle. 18°
IV. RECENT PROSECUTIONS FOR TRADITIONAL VIOLATIONS 01' THE
LAW OF WAR: UNITED STATES V. PASSARO AND
UNITED STATES V. GREEN
Two recent cases demonstrate that the legal framework for prose-
cuting violations of the law of war in U.S. federal courts is adequate and
effective.' 81 In 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina in United States v. Passaro presided over a case in which
the SW j Statute %vas used to prosecute an assault that was also a viola-
tion of the law of war under customary international law.' 52 The U.S.
government is also presently using the MEJA in the case of United Slates
v. Green in the Western District of Kentucky to prosecute an American
citizen who allegedly raped a teenage Iraqi girl and murdered her and
her family. 163 In both cases, however, the government declined to use
the War Crimes Act to pursue justice for acts that are considered viola-
tions of the law of war under customary international law.' 84
162 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2000 & Stipp. III 2003).
165 Id. § 1112 (2000).
154 Id. § 1113 .
165 Id. § 1117 .
156 Id. § 113.
167 18 U.S.C. § 114.
158 See supra notes 20-56 and accompanying text.
166 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 7,113-114,1111 -1113,1117 (2000 & Stipp. III 2003).
160 See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
161 see infra notes 165-242 and accompanying text.
162 See No. 5:04-CR-211-1	 June 17, 2004); infra notes 165-200 and accompa-
nying text.
163 See No. 3:06-MJ-00230 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 7, 2006); infra notes 201-242 and accompany-
ing text.
164 See infra notes 178-188,196-200,239-242 and accompanying text.
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A. United States v. Passaro: The Use of the WTI Statute
1. Statutory Basis for Prosecution
David Passaro was charged with assault using the SMTJ Statute af-
ter he beat Abdul Wall over the course of a two-day "interrogation" in
the summer of 2003 at a military base in Afghanistan. 166 Although Pas-
saro was employed as a contractor by the CIA and his activities were in
support of the mission of the Department of Defense overseas, his mis-
conduct took place prior to amendment of the MEJA in 2004. 166 Under
these circumstances, the appropriate means of charging him was by use
of the SMTJ Statute. 167 Specifically, the government charged Passaro by
use of § 7(9) (A) of the SMTJ Statute on the grounds that the base in
Afghanistan was a place in a foreign state used by the U.S. government;
Passaro committed an offense as a national of the United States in vio-
lation of a federal criminal assault statute that applies within the SMTJ;
and Passaro, at the time, did not fall within the class of persons covered
by the MEJA. 168
2. Procedural Posture and Result
Passaro was originally charged in June of 2004 with two counts or
assault with a dangerous weapon and two counts of assault resulting in
serious bodily injury. 169 He was tried by a federal jury in the Eastern
District of North Carolina)" On August 17, 2006, he was found guilty
of one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury and guilty of
lesser included offenses on the remaining charges. 171 A motion for
judgment of acquittal filed by Passaro was denied on October 26,
2006. 172 Although the maximum penalty for his crime included eleven
169 See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000 & Stipp. 111 2003); Indict ITIClit, Possum, supra note 2, at 1-4.
166 MEJA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000 & Stipp. IV 2004); Indictment, Passaro, supra
note 2, at 1; supra notes 129-131 and accompanying- text.
167 See 18 U.S.C. § 7; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267; Indictment, Passaro, supra note 2, at 1-3.
168 See 18 U.S.C. § 7(9)(A); MEJA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261(a), 3267 (2000), amended by id.
§ 3267 (Stipp. IV 2004); Indictment, Passaro, supra note 2, at 1-3.
169 htdictmen1, Passaro, supra note 2, at 1-4.
170
	
at 1; Andrea Weigl, Passaro Convicted of Assaulting Afghan, NEWS & OBSERVER (Ra-
leigh, N.C.), Aug. 18, 2006, at 1A, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/497/story/
476483-p2.html.
171 See Jury Verdict at 1-4, Riskin), No. 5:04-CR-211-1; Weigl, supra note 170; White &
Linzer, supra note 4.
172 Order Denying Motion for Judgment of Acquittal at 1, Possum, No. 5:04-CR-211-1.
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and a half years' imprisonment, he was sentenced to serve only eight
years and four months on February 13, 2007. 173
3. Analysis of the Prosecution
The facts of this case involved allegations that Passaro did "will-
fully, knowingly and intentionally assault Abdul Wali with a dangerous
weapon, namely, a flashlight, with intent to do bodily harm" and that
Wall subsequently died. 174 Media reports questioned why he was not
charged with something more serious than assault with a dangerous
weapon or assault resulting in serious bodily injury. 175 The Depart-
ment of justice commented that, due to a lack of evidence, additional
charges were not warranted. 176 It appears the main justification of-
fered by the Department of Justice for not pursuing more serious
charges was that Wall's family refused to allow the performance of an
autopsy which would have yielded additional evidence to support
more serious charges. 177
Based on the facts specified in the indictment, Passaro could have
been charged by use of the War Crimes Act as it existed prior to the
passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. 178 At the time of his
offense and through his trial, the War Crimes Act criminalized conduct
"which constitutes a violation of [C]ommon Article 3 of the interna-
tional conventions signed at Geneva." 179 The penalty for such a viola-
175 Nation in Brief supra note 4; Weigl, supra note 170; White & Linger, supra note 4.
1 74 Indictment, Passaro, supra note 2, at 1-3.
175 See id. at 2-4; Susan Schmidt & Dana Priest, Civilian Charged in Beating of Afghan De-
tainer, WAsut. PosT, June 18, 2004, at Al; Scott Shane, C.I.A. Contractor Guilty in Beating of
Afghan Who Later Died, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, at A8; Weigh supra note 170; White &
Linger, supra note 4.
176 Schmidt & Priest, supra note 175.
177 See id.; Shane, supra note 175; Weigl, supra note 170; White & Linger, supra note 4.
178 See War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441
(West 2000, Stipp. 2006 & Supp. IV 2007); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pith. L. No,
109-366, § 6, 120 Stat. 2600, 2632-35 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A, § 2441 (West
2000, Stipp. 2006 & Stipp. IV 2007)); Indictment, Passim, supra note 2, at 1. Although the
Bush administration initially refused to acknowledge that Common Article 3 applied to the
conflict with Afghanistan, the Supreme Court has since held in Hamdan u Rumsfeld that
Common Article 3 applies to the treatment of detainees from that conflict. See 126 S. Ct.
2749, 2794-98 (2006) (majority opinion in part and plurality opinion in part).
See War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441
(West 2000, Stipp. 2006 & Supp. IV 2007); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3;
Indictment, Passaro, supra note 2, at 1; Weigl, supra note 170.
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tion is up to life in prison. 180 Where death results to the victim from the
violation, the crime carries a possible death sentence. 18 '
Prior to revision by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the
War Crimes Act criminalized certain conduct by incorporating Com-
mon Article 3's prohibitions against "violence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and tor-
ture" upon detained persons during the course of an armed conflict
not of an international character. 182 Additionally, the War Crimes Act
incorporated Common Article 3's prohibitions regarding humiliating,
inhumane, or degrading treatment of detained persons.'"
The prosecution offered in its case that Wali, while in captivity,
was subjected to multiple kicks to the groin and multiple strikes to his
hands, legs, and abdomen with a Maglite flashlight. 184 Although it may
be difficult to define and prove humiliating, inhumane, or degrading
treatment, the facts alleged against Passaro clearly are those where a
detained person was subject to violence to life and person in violation
of Common Article 3 and the War Crimes Act.I 85 Although Passaro
argued that the death of Wali was the result of a heart attack and not
the beating, a guilty finding under the War Crimes Act would still
have provided the opportunity to impose up to a life sentence regard-
less of the cause of death. 186
Even under the present version of the War Crimes Act, intention-
ally causing serious bodily injury is considered by statutory definition to
be a grave breach of Common Article 3 when such an assault violates
180 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441(a).
181 Id.
182 See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000); Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6; Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 37, art. 3; supra notes 00-70, 101-104 and accompanying text.
188 See 18 U.S.C. § 2441; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3; supra notes
60-70, 101-104 and accompanying text.
184 Indictment, Passaro, supra note 2, at 1; Weigl, supra note 170.
las See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Stipp. 2006 & Sttpp. IV 2007); Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 37, art. 3; 152 CONG. REC. 117535 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 20(16) (state-
ment of Rep. Hunter); R. Jeffrey Srnith, Detainee Abuse Charges Feared, WASH. POST, July 28,
2006, at Al; Draft Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., & Robert
J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., Appli-
cation of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda anti Taliban Detainees 6 (Jan. 9, 2002) [hereinaf-
ter Yoo Memorandum], available at littp://antiwar.corn/news/?articleid=2637; Michael
Isikoff, Exclusive: Read War Crimes Memos, MSNBC.cora, May 19, 2004, http://www.instibc.
msn.com/id/4999734; John Sifton, Criminal, Immunize Thyself SLATE, Aug. 11, 2006, http://
www.slate.cont/id/2147585.
188 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441; Scott Shane, C.I.A. Interrogator's Defense to Cite Bush at Brutal-
ity Trial, NY. Tim ES, Feb. 11, 2005, at Al 1.
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the law of war) 87 Because Passaro was found guilty of intentionally caus-
ing an assault resulting in serious bodily injury, he similarly could have
been found guilty under the current War Crimes Act because a viola-
tion of the law of war takes place under Common Article 3 when one
subjects a detained person to violence to life and person. 188
Charges of murder, involuntary manslaughter, or torture were also
possible in the case against Passaro.' 89 For both practical and burden-of-
proof reasons, the prosecution most likely decided that pursuit of as-
sault charges alone was the best way to proceed.' 90
Having to prove intent to cause death likely prohibited a charge of
murder because it is unlikely that Passaro intended to kill Wali as part
of his interrogation. 01 Proof of torture required the prosecution to
meet a very high standard, and show that Passaro acted under color of
law and specifically intended to inflict severe physical pain or suffering
upon Wali. 192 A prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, on its face,
sounds better than a prosecution for assault resulting in serious bodily
injury. 193 But, practically speaking, a conviction for involuntary man-
slaughter carries a lesser penalty—up to six years—than that for a con-
viction of assault resulting in serious bodily injury—up to ten years)"
Overall, it is understandable why the prosecution chose to pursue
assault charges instead of murder, manslaughter, or torture charges. 195
Although there is no account as to why the War Crimes Act was not
07 See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (6) (2(100); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (cl) (1) (F); Third Geneva Con-
vention, supra note 37, art. 3; supra notes 20-56 and accompanying text. The War Crimes
Act of 1996 defines the term ''serious bodily injury" by incorporating the definition that is
used in the federal assault statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2); id. § 1365(h) (3); 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2441(d) (2) (B).
188 See 18 U.S.C. § 1 13(a) (6); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441(d) (1)(F); Third Geneva Convention,
supra note 37, arts. 3, 13; Weigl, .supra note 170; supra notes 20-56 and accompanying text.
189 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111-1112 (2000); Anti-Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000 &
Stipp. Ill 2003); Shane, supra note 175.
190 See 18 U.S.C. § 113; Schmidt & Priest, supra note 175; Shane, supra note 175; Weigl,
supra note 170; White & Linzer, ,supra note 4.
191 See 18 U.S.C. § 1111; Schmidt & Priest, supra note 175. Passaro and another CIA
contractor claimed to have performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Wali. Schmidt &
Priest, supra note 175.
192 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (20(x0, Supp. III 2003 & Stipp. IV 2004). The burden
of proving severe pain and specific intent most likely resulted in the Department of justice
declining to prosecute Passaro for torture. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting
Assistant Attorney Gen., to James B. Convey, Deputy Attorney Gen., Legal Standards Appli-
cable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2540-2340A, at 5-11,16-17 (Dec. 30, 2004). available at Imp://
wwwaisdoj.goviolc/18usc23402340a2.1inn.
195 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 113,1112 (2000).
194 See id. §§ 113(a) (6), 1112(b).
195 See supra notes 189-194 and accompanying text.
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used in this case, the most likely explanation is that the Department of
Justice had a strong aversion to any use of the War Crimes Act to prose-
cute someone, especially a contractor for the CIA, for extraterritorial
misconduct in the Global War on Terrorism. 196 To use the War Crimes
Act to prosecute someone for misconduct in Afghanistan would
amount to an implicit admission by the executive branch that the Ge-
neva Conventions did in fact apply to that conilict.' 97 Such an admis-
sion would be inconsistent with the policies and arguments put forth by
the executive branch since the beginning of combat operations against
the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 198
Additionally, a denial that the War Crimes Act applied at all to the
Global War on Terrorism helps to establish a precedent that precludes
future prosecutions of government officials should a power shift take
place in Washington. 199 Refusing to apply the War Crimes Act to the
Global War on Terrorism also serves to reinforce the power of the
President to decide how and when to regulate the conduct of foreign
and military policy overseas. 200
B. United States v. Green: The Use of the MEJA
I. Factual and Statutory Basis for Prosecution
South of Baghdad, in the town of Mahmoudiyah, Iraq, Abeer
Kassel-El Hainza Al-janabi lived in a home about 200 meters from a mili-
1 " See War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp.
IV 2007); Elizabeth Holtzman, Bush Seeks Immunity for Violating War Crimes Act of 1996, CM,
SuNI-TtmEs, Sept. 23, 2006, at 14 thereinafter Holtzman, Bush Seeks Immunity]; Elizabeth
Holtzman, 'Torture and Accountability, NATION, July 18, 2005, at 21 [hereinafter Holtzman,
Torture and Accountability]; Smith, supra note 185; Draft Memorandum from Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Decision Re
Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qacda
and the Taliban 2 (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Gonzales Memorandum], available at http://
www.tusubc.msn.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek; Yoo Memorandum, supra note 185, at
2-5, 41-42; Isikoff, supra note 185; Sifion, supra note 185.
197 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441; Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 196, at 2; Yoo Memo-
randum, supra note 185, at 14-34.
198 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794-98 (majority opinion in part and plurality opinion in
part); Smith, supra note 185; Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 196, at 1-4; Yoo Memo-
randum, supra note 185, at 14-34; Isikoff, supra note 185.
199 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441; Holtzman, Bush Seeks Immunity, supra note 196; HOIMISall,
Torture. and Accountability, supra note 196; Smith, supra note 185; Gonzales Memorandum,
supra note 196, at 2; Yoo Memorandum, supra note 185, at 2-14; Isikoff, supra note 185;
Sifton, supra note 185.
211° See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441; You Memorandum, supra note 185, at 11, 38-42; Isikoff, su-
pra note 185.
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tary checkpoint manned by soldiers from the U.S. Army."' Along with
her six-year-old sister Hadeel, Abeer and her parents, Kassem Hamza
Rachid Al-Janabi and Fakhriya Taha Mohsine Al-Janabi, resided in one
of the most dangerous areas of Iraq, known .as the "Triangle of
Death.”202 just fourteen years old, Abeer, and her mother, became wor-
ried in early March of 2006 after some of the U.S. soldiers assigned to
the area made advances towards her. 203
Steven Green deployed to Iraq in September of 2005 as an infantry
soldier with the 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne
Division. 204 In December of 2005, Green's unit was conducting security
operations when an Iraqi civilian approached the checkpoint he was
manning, pulled out a pistol, and shot two of his fellow soldiers at
point-blank rat ige. 2°5 After seeking mental help regarding the incident
from an Army Combat Stress Team during that same month, Green was
diagnosed with homicidal ideations, prescribed antipsychotic drugs,
and sent back to his unit to resume his regular combat duties." 6
Green and Abeer's paths crossed on March 12, 2006. 207 Green had
previously been to Abeer's home as part of his duties in Mahmoudi-
-yah. 208 After talking with his fellow soldiers about raping Abeer, Green
and three others allegedly drank some alcohol, changed into dark
clothes, grabbed their rifles and a shotgun, and went to Abcer's family
home.209 Once inside, Green allegedly took the family's AK-47 assault
rifle, put Abeer's parents and her sister in a bedroom, and killed
them.21 ° Upon exiting the bedroom, Green and another soldier alleg-
201
 Indictment at 3, Green, No. 3:0644J-00230 [hereinafter Indictment, Green]; Warrant
for Arrest at 4, Green, No. 3:06-10J-00230 thereinafter Warrant for Arrest, Green]. All case
information is available at hap://www.kywd.uscourts.gov/3-06-00230/DocketSheet.htm
(last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
202 Indictment, Green, supra note 201, at 3; Ryan Lenz, "Homicidal" Soldier Was Returned
to Duty, flousToN CintoN., Jan. 10, 2007, at I.
204 See Warrant fin - Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at 5; Josh White, Ex-Soldier Charged in
Killing of Iraqi Family, WAsn. POST, July 4, 2006, at Al.
204 Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at 3; Lenz, supra note 202.
204
 Lcnz, SUM'a note 202; Andrew Tilghman, "I Came over Here Because I Wanted to Kill
People," WASH, PosT, July 30, 2006, at Bl.
2°6 Lenz, supra note 202.
207 Indictment, Green, supra note 201, at 1-4; Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra note 201,
at 4.
208 Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at 5; White, supra note 203.
209 Indictment, Green, supra note 201, at 3; Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at
5-6.
210 Indictment, Green, supra note 201, at 3-4, 6-12; Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra
note 201, at 5-6.
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edly raped Abeer.211 Green then allegedly shot Abeer in the head sev-
eral times and had another soldier throw the AK-47 into a canal across
the street from Abeer's home. 212 After the attack, Abeer's body was cov-
ered in blankets and set on fire. 213 Later that day, a local Iraqi observed
the fire, discovered the bodies, and reported it to the American mill-
tary.214
On March 20, 2006, Green was examined again by the Army Com-
bat Stress Team and diagnosed with an antisocial personality disor-
der. 215 Due to his mental condition, Green was sent back to the United
States around March 27, 2006, to be processed for discharge from the
U.S. Army. 216 On May 16, 2006, Green was honorably and completely
discharged from the U.S. Army. 217
Until the mutilated bodies of two soldiers from Green's unit were
found on June 19, 2006, after they had been kidnapped and killed by
insurgents, Green and his fellow soldiers went about their lives.
ing a combat stress debriefing arising out of the deaths of the kid-
napped soldiers, the story about the rape and murder of Abeer and her
family came out. 219 On June 27, 2006, the Army Criminal Investigative
Division requested assistance and turned over its pursuit of charges
against Green to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the "FBI"). 220
The FBI took charge of the investigation of Green and a warrant for his
arrest was issued on June 30, 2006, by using the MEJA for charges of
rape and murder. 221
Green was charged by use of the MEJA because the offenses took
place while he was a member of the Armed Forces subject to the UCMJ,
211 Indictment, Green, .supra note 201, at 4, 13-14; Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra note
201, at 5-6.
212 Indictment, Green, supra note 201, at 4, 6, 9, 19; Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra
note 201, at 6.
212 Indictment, Green, supra note 201, at 19; Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra note 201,
at 6-7; White, supra note 203; Tim Whitmire, Ex-Soldier Charged with Rape, Murder: Accused of
Killing Family in Iraq, QM SUN-TIMES, July 4, 2006, at 21.
. 214 Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at 6.
215 Lenz, supra note '202.
2111 See id.
217 Indictment, Green, supra note 201, at 1; Lenz, supra note 202; White, supra note 203;
Whitmire, supra note 213.
218 See Warrant fur Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at 4, 7; Lenz, supra note 202; White,
supra note 203; Whitmire, supra note 213.
20 Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at 4; Lenz, supra note 202; White, supra
note 203; Whitmire, supra note 213.
220 Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at 4.
221 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 2241 (2000); MEJA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000, Stipp. III
2003 & Stipp. IV 2004); Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at 1, 3-4.
218 I)u r-
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military court-martial jurisdiction under the UCMJ terminated upon
his complete discharge from the military, and the offenses were pun-
ishable by imprisonment for more than one year had the offenses
taken place in the SMTJ.222 By use of the MEJA, Green was charged in
the initial criminal complaint with three counts of premeditated mur-
der, one count of premeditated murder in perpetration of aggravated
sexual abuse, and one count of using force to cause another person to
engage in a sexual act.223 Although Green fell within the provisions of
the MEJA because the alleged offenses were committed while he was a
member of the Armed Forces, the method of prosecution and charges
would equally apply had the accused been a private contractor or gov-
ernment agent employed in support of the mission of the Department
of Defense overseas.224
2. Procedural Posture and Current Status
After a warrant was issued on June 30, 2006, Green was arrested in
Marion, North Carolina, while returning home from the funeral of one
of the mutilated soldiers. 225 After he made his initial appearance in
court on July 6, 2006, a federal grand jury assembled to decide what
charges should be made based on the facts of the case. 226 On Novem-
ber 7, 2006, the grand jury returned a seventeen-count indictment car-
rying a possible punishment of death if convicted on all counts. 227 As of
April 4, 2007, his trial in the Western District of Kentucky has yet to be
scheduled. 228
222 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 2241; 18 U.S.C. § 3261; Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435,
437, 451 (1987) (holding that court-martial jurisdiction is based on the accused having a
military status); Criminal Complaint at 1-2, Green, No. 3:06-MJ-00230 [hereinafter Crimi-
nal Complaint, Green]; Warrant fur Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at 3, 7.
223 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267; Criminal Complaint, Green, supra note 222, at 1-2; NVarrant
for Arrest, Green, ,supra note 201, at 1, 3, 7.
224 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261, 3267; Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at 3, 7; supra
notes 124-130 and accompanying text.
225 Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at 1; White, supra note 203; Whitmire, su-
pra note 213.
243 Indictment, Green, supra note 201, at 1; Order on Initial Appearance at 2, Green, No.
3:06-MJ-00230.
227 Indictment, Green, supra note 201, at 1 - 19.
223 United States District Court of Western Kentucky, United States v. Green, Steven D.,
http://www.kywd.uscourts.gov/5-06-00230/Green_Case.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
730	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 48:699
3. Analysis of the Prosecution in Comparison to That in Passaro
Much like the case of Passaro, the facts as alleged in Green demon-
strate the exact sort of conduct that the War Crimes Act prohibits, in
either its present or pre-Military Commissions Act form. 2" Under the
definitions for grave breaches in the Geneva Conventions and the
War Crimes Act, it is abundantly clear that the rape of a teenager and
the murder of her and her family are war crimes under both the stat-
ute and customary international law. 2"
The interesting twist in Green is that charges have been pursued by
using federal criminal statutes that carry the same possible penalty-
death—as the War Crimes Act. 2s 1 Unlike the Passaro case, the investiga-
tion in Green produced statements from co-conspirators and physical
evidence that support serious charges, which include premeditated
murder. 232 Because Green faces the death penalty or life in prison, the
calls for justice and criticisms of lenient treatment heard in the Passaro
case are not present in Green. 235
Green demonstrates that, in serious instances of extraterritorial
misconduct violating the law of war, a federal criminal prosecution by
use of Title 18 criminal statutes provides the Federal government with
the ability to prosecute war crimes that occur overseas. 234 The Green
and Passaro cases together also show the prosecutorial difficulties en-
countered in pursuing such crimes. 2"
On the one hand, the prosecution in Passaro lacked the evidence
necessary to support more serious charges beyond assault, was made
difficult by government classification of information, and involved the
229 See War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441
(West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp. IV 2007); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-366, § 6, 120 Star_ 2600, 2632-35 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West
2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp. IV 2007)); Indictment, Green, supra note 201, at 1-4; Warrant for
Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at 3-6; supra notes 2-6, 165-200 and accompanying text.
23° See War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp.
IV 2007); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, arts. 3, 130; Indictment, Green, supra
note 201, at 1-4; Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra note 201, at 3-6; supra notes 20-56 and
accompanying text.
251 See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); 18 U.S.C.A, § 2441(a); Indictment,
Green, supra note 201, at 2, 6-12.
"2 See 18 U.S.C. § 1111; Indictment, Green, supra note 201, at 6-9; Warrant for Arrest,
Green, supra note 201, at 1, 3-7; supra notes 2-6, 165-200 and accompanying text.
299
	 18 U.S.C. § -till; 18 U.S.C.A. § 244I(a); Indictment, Green, supra note 201, at 2,
6-12; supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text.
254 See 18 U.S.C. § 1111; MEJA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); In-
dictment, Green, supra note 201, at 1-4,
"5 See infra notes 236-237 and accompanying text.
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issue of an assault committed during an interrogation. 236 The Green
prosecution, on the other hand, appears to benefit from the coopera-
tion of co-conspirators, the help of the Army Criminal Investigative Di-
vision, the help of Iraqi authorities in gathering evidence in Iraq, and
the support of the military in bringing Abeer's rapist and murderer to
justice.237 The cases show that any prosecution for an extraterritorial
war crime must deal with the issues of the remoteness of the crime
scene; issues arising out of combat operations in finding witnesses, vic-
tims, and evidence; and cultural prohibitions on autopsies. 238
Even though Green is a case where charges of rape and murder are
amply supported by the evidence, the question remains: Why not use
the War Crimes Act in a prosecution where it is so clear that a war
crime took place?2" Again, pressures from within the executive branch
and Department of Justice are likely to blame.24° Refusing to use the
War Crimes Act to punish war crimes from the conflict in Iraq avoids
setting a precedent that a criminal statute constrains action by the
President and the military in prosecuting the war. 241 It also serves to
avoid setting a precedent that the law may he used against U.S. gov-
ernment agents for their conduct should it violate the Geneva Conven-
tions. 242
V. GETTING AWAY WITH WAR CRIMES: THE GAP IN THE MEJA
An assault by striking, heating, or wounding is a violation of the law
of war when the victim is a prisoner, detainee, or member of the civilian
populace.243 Unfortunately, the MEJA is not applicable to these types of
assaults because the maximum penalties are not sufficient to trigger the
236 See Indictment, Passaro, supra note 2, at 1-4; Schmidt & Priest, supra note 175;
Shane, supra note 175; Weigl, supra note 170; White & Linzer, supra note 4.
257 See Indictment, Green, supra note 201, at 1-4, 19-22; Warrant for Arrest, Green, supra
note 201, at 3-7; Lenz, supra note 202; White, supra note 203; Whitmire, supra note 213.
238 See supra notes 236-237 and accompanying text,
239 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1111, 2241 (West 2001, Supp. 2006 & Supp. 11 2006); War Crimes
Act or 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp. 2007); supra notes 2(11-
224 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
241 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441; Yoo Memorandum, supra note 185, at 11, 34-42; lsikoff, su-
pra note 185.
242 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, arts. 3, 129;
Holtzman, Bush Seeks Immunity, supra note 196; Holtzman, Thrture and Accountability, supra
note 196; Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 196, at 2; Yoo Memorandum, supra note 185,
at 11, 41-42; isikoff, supra note 185; Sifton, supra note 185.
249 See infra notes 246-252 and accompanying text.
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application of the statute. 244 This gap in the MESA leaves the govern-
ment without a means to prosecute war crimes in certain situations.245
A. Assaults by Striking, Beating or Wounding as War Crimes
An assault by striking, beating, or wounding is a war crime when
committed in a fashion that violates the law of war as understood by
customary international law. 246 As discussed in the preceding text, the
law of war includes the Geneva Conventions.247 In international and
noninternational armed conflicts, a physical assault committed by a
party to a conflict violates the Geneva Conventions when it subjects
prisoners, detainees, or members of the civilian populace to violence to
their life or person.248
For example, an assault by striking, beating, or wounding would be
a war crime where: (1) an American citizen, employed as an interroga-
tor by the Department of Defense overseas, punches a detainee in the
face without justification during an interrogation at a military com-
pound; or (2) an American citizen, employed by a Department of De-
fense contractor overseas as a truck driver, slaps an Iraqi civilian in a
dispute over the sale of an item from a souvenir stand located within an
American military compound. 249 These two examples are by no means
all-inclusive, but they highlight the fact that in certain circumstances,
an assault by striking, beating, or wounding can fall within the realm of
war crimes by violating the Geneva Conventions. 25°
In the first example, the punching of a detainee without justifica-
tion by one employed by the Department of Defense violates the Ge-
neva Conventions and the law of war because it subjects a protected
person—a detainee—to violence to his life or person. 251 In the second
example, the slapping of an Iraqi civilian by one working in support
of the Department of Defense violates the Geneva Conventions and
244 See infra notes 253-260 and accompanying text.
245 See infra notes 246-260 and accompanying text.
246 See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (4) (2000); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, arts. 3,
13; supra notes 20-56 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 36-38, 41-47 and accompanying text.
248 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, arts. 3-4, 13.
249 See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (4); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, arts. 3-4, 13;
supra notes 20-56 and accompanying text.
250 See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (4); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, arts. 3-4, 13;
supra notes 20-56 and accompanying text.
251 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, arts. 3-4, 13; supra notes 20-56 and
accompanying text.
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the law of war because it subjects a protected person—a civilian not
taking part in hostilities—to violence to his life or person. 252
B. The MEJA Gap for Assaults by Striking, Beating, or Waunding
In the above fictional situations, both civilian and military authori-
ties may consider it appropriate in certain circumstances to punish the
offenders by administrative action through their employer, such as a
reprimand or firing. 253 But, when media pressures or a need for justice
dictate that these types of war crimes be prosecuted in a U.S. federal
court, the government is left without recourse under the current state
of the law.254
Because the maximum six-month penalty for an assault by striking,
beating, or wounding does not exceed the one-year requirement, that
triggers the use of the MEJA to prosecute, the fictional employees of
the Department of Defense could not be prosecuted by using the
MEJA.255 Additionally, the status of the offender, as one subject to the
MEJA, prohibits prosecution by use of § 7(9) of the SMTJ Statute:256
•Fortunately, the situations where the MEJA has a gap are limited be-
cause other serious crimes and assaults, involving dangerous weapons
or serious bodily injury, carry sufficient penalties that trigger the MEJA
to allow for prosecution in a civilian court in the United States. 257
Some commentators point to the lack of any prosecutions of con-
tractors by using the MEJA in the Global War on Terrorism to suggest
that the Department of Justice lacks the desire and resources neces-
sary to pursue such cases. 258 One critic points to the difficulties prose-
cutors face in assembling a case against an offender from 9000 miles
away while contending with dispersed witnesses and the competing
demands of local cases to account for the lack of use of the MEJA to
prosecute a single civilian for misconduct in the Global War on Ter-
252 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, arts. 3-4,15; supra notes 20-56 and
accompanying text.
253 See Singer, The Law Catches Up to Private Militaries, supra note 142.
254 See supra notes 91-160 and accompanying text.
233 See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (4) (2000); MEJA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000 & Supp, IV
2004); supra notes 124-133 and accompanying text.
256 See 18 U.S.C. § 7(9) (Supp. Ill 2003); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267; supra notes 129-133
and accompanying text.
257 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 113-114; 18 U.S.C. § 1111-1112 (2000 & Stipp. III 2003); 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 2241-2242,2244 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Stipp. II 2006); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261—
3267.
258 See Fidler & Sevastopulo, supra note 142; Singer, Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 142; Singer; The Law Catches Up to Private Militaries, supra note 192.
734	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 48:699
rorism.259 Although there are procedural difficulties in using the
MEJA, those reasons are no excuse for allowing a gap to continue to
exist that could prohibit the future prosecution of American citizens
whose actions violate the law of war. 26°
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
The MEJA gap can and should be corrected by congressional ac-
tion.261 By eliminating the requirement that an offense be punishable
by more than one year of imprisonment or by changing the penalties
for certain offenses, Congress can extend the reach of the law to cover
certain assaults by American citizens that violate the Iaw of war. 262 Ad-
ditionally, by repealing the authority for civilian courts-martial to pre-
serve the rights of citizens to a trial in a civilian court, Congress can
ensure that the burden of prosecuting instances of overseas civilian
misconduct is handled by the Department of Justice and not a mili-
tary justice system designed for those with a military status. 265
A. Options for Fixing the MEJA
Since its inception in 2000, the MEJA has been subject to a variety
of criticisms. 2" It was modified in the aftermath of Abu Ghraib to en-
sure that it covered personnel working in support of the Department of
Defense overseas, not just those working for the Department of De-
fense. 265 Legislation is pending that would create a federal investigative
unit focused on overseas misconduct and redefine the class of person-
nel covered by the MEJA to cover more broadly those Americans in-
volved in supporting any contingency operation. 266 What continues to
259 See Singer, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 142; Singer, The Law Catches Up to
Private Militaries, supra note 142.
260 See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (4); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267; supra notes 246-257 and accom-
panying text.
261 See infra notes 264-272 and accompanying text.
202 See infra notes 264-272 and accompanying text.
263 See infra notes 273-279 and accompanying text.
264 See Schmitt, supra note 130, at 41-45 (highlighting the MEJA's lack of authority over
certain contractors prior to 2004); Stein, .supra note 7, at 598-607 (describing past and pre-
sent problems with the MEJA); Press Release, Representative David Nice, Price Introduces
Private Security Contractor Legislation (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://price.house.gov/
News/ DoctimentSi ngle.aspx?Documen tl D=55209.
265 See MEJA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); supra notes 129-130 and
accompanying text.
266 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261, 3267; Transparency and Accountability in Military and Secu-
rity Contracting Act of 2007, S. 674, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); Transparency and Ac-
countability in Security Contracting Act of 2007,1-1.R. 369, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
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be overlooked is the gap that exists for crimes that are punishable by a
sentence of one year or less if committed within the SMTJ of the
United States.267
Congress has the power to modify the law to fill this gap in one of
two ways: (1) by changing the language of the MEJA to eliminate the
requirement that the offense carry a possible punishment of more
than one year of imprisonment, or (2) by increasing the penalties for
certain offenses that Congress desires the MEJA to cover. 268 Of these
two options, changing the language of the MEJA would encompass
the widest range of offenses and provide for the greatest reach of
prosecution for overseas misconduct by American citizens supporting
the mission of the Department or Defense. 269
But, attempts to expand the scope of offenses covered by the MEJA
would likely run into opposition from lobbyists and trade groups that
represent contractors, such as the Professional Services Counci1. 27° If
modifying the language of the MEJA is not possible for reasons of po-
litical compromise or expediency, then the maximum penalty for as-
sault by striking, beating, or wounding should be increased to exceed
one year of imprisonment so as to bring these offenses within those
covered by the MEJA.271 If turning these types of assaults into felonies is •
unpalatable, Congress has the power to modify the assault statute to
add a penalty that exceeds one year of imprisonment for assaults con-
ducted upon a person in the custody of the United States or entitled to
the protections of the Geneva Conventions. 272
267 See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000 & Stipp, Ill 2003); supra notes 124-133, 253-260 and ac-
companying text.
260 See 18 U.S.C. § 3261.
26° See id. §§ 3261-3267.
270 See id; Witte, supra note 142; Fidler & Sevastopulu, supra note 142.
271 See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (4) (2000); MEJA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000 & Stipp. W
2004).
272 See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (4); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, arts. 3-4. For
example, Congress could modify the assault statute to read:
18 U.S.C. 113(a) (4) Assault by striking, beating, or wounding, by a fine under
this title or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, or if the vic-
tim of the assault is in the custody of the United States or an individual enti-
tled to the protections of the Genera Conventions, by a fine under this title or
imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.
See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (4); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, arts. 3-4.
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B. Repeal the Authority for Civilian Courts-Martial in the UCMJ
Notwithstanding the constitutional questions raised by the recent
change to thC jurisdiction of the UCMJ, the existence of an alternative
method of holding American citizens accountable for their misconduct
while overseas in support of the Department of Defense does little to
encourage or require the Department of Justice to pursue charges and
apply the MEJA as passed by Congress. 273 If anything, the attempted
and questionable extension of courts-martial jurisdiction over civilians
could facilitate the partial withdrawal of the Department ofJustice from
the business of regulating the conduct of those Americans working in
support of the Department of Defense overseas. 274
Over the course of the last decade, Congress and the military,
through legislation and regulations, have worked out a system that
allows for the bringing of civilians to justice for certain extraterritorial
misconduct. 275 A duty to police contractors should not be imposed on
military commanders where the majority of contractors are not em-
bedded in their unit and often work alongside in solely a coordinating
role. 276
If anything, the rights of an American citizen to a trial in a civilian
court should be reason enough to limit the jurisdiction of a court-
martial to those that have a military status. 277 For now, the revision
273 See UCM j, 10 U.S.C.A. § 802 (West 1998 & Supp. IV 2007); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267;
Witte, supra note 142; Singer, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 142; supra notes 138-150
and accompanying text.
274 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 802; Witte, supra note 142; Fidler & Scvastopulo, supra note 142;
Singer, The Law Catches Up to Private Militaries, supra note 142; supra notes 142-150 and
accompanying text.
275 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267; Transparency and Accountability in Military and Secu-
rity Contracting Act of 2007, S. 674, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) (proposing establishment
of an FBI Theater Investigative Unit to investigate violations of law by contractors that are
prosecutable using the MEJA); Transparency and Accountability in Security Contracting
Act of 2007, H.R. 369, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) (House version of the Senate bill); U.S.
DEPT OF DEF., INSTRUCTION No. 5521.11, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS EM-
PLOYED I3Y OR ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, CERTAIN SER-
VICE MEMBERS, AND FORMER SERVICE MEMBERS (2005); supra notes 124-137 and accom-
panying text.
276 See Merle & McCarthy, supra note 129; Press Release, Representative David Price,
supra note 264; Singer, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 142; Singer, The Law Catches Up
to Private Militaries, salmi note 142.
277 See &sloth) v. United States, 483 U.S. 434, 436, 439, 450-51 (1987) (holding that
court-martial jurisdiction is based on the accused having a military status); McElroy v,
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 283-84 (1960) (holding that civilian employees accompanying
the military overseas in peacetime may not be subject to civilian courts-martial for non-
capital offenses); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960) (holding that civilian em-
ployees accompanying the military overseas may not be subject to civilian courts-martial
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made to the UCMJ is the law of the land. 278 When a test case involving a
twenty-first-century civilian court-martial makes its way to the Supreme
Court, the Court could very well announce the same language it used
largely to extinguish civilian courts-martial in the twentieth century:
When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is
abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of
the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in an-
other land. This is not a novel concept. To the contrary, it is
as old as government. 279
CONCLUSION
Federal laws, when considered in their totality, provide the gov-
ernment with the ability to prosecute American citizens for extraterri-
torial violations of the law of war. The War Crimes Act, Genocide Con-
vention Implementation Act, and Anti-Torture Statute offer prosecu-
tors a means for addressing specific conduct that is universally con-
demned. The MEJA and the SMTJ Statute offer prosecutors a means
for addressing in U.S. federal courts the majority of extraterritorial
conduct by American citizens that violates the law of war. Additionally,
the recent well-intentioned expansion of the jurisdiction of the UCMJ
could provide an alternative means of prosecution by use of a court-
martial for extraterritorial misconduct by American citizens accompa-
nying the military in a declared war or contingency operation. Taken
together, an adequate legal framework exists to bring American citizens
who violate the laws of war to justice.
The MEJA and SMTJ Statute have proven their utility and viability in
the recent cases of United States v. Passaro and United States u Green. These
two cases show that the dearth of prosecutions of civilians for extraterri-
torial misconduct in the Global War on Terrorism is not the result of a
lack of a legal framework, but stems from other factors ranging from the
practical difficulties of assembling a case to political considerations in-
for capital offenses); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (plurality opinion) (holding that
civilian dependents accompanying the military overseas may not be subject to civilian
courts-martial for capital offenses); United States v. Averette, 363, 365 (1970)
(holding that a civilian accompanying the Armed Forces may only be subject to a court-
martial where Congress has made an express declaration of war); Witte, supra note 142;
supra notes 138-150 and accompanying text.
vs See 10 U.S.C.A. § 802; Singer, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 142.
279 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 6.
738	 Balton College Law Review	 [Vol. 48:699
volving how best to fight the Global War on Terrorism. Still, however,
there are weaknesses in these laws that can and should be addressed.
Although the MEJA has evolved in the six and a half years since its
enactment to cover American citizens working overseas in support of
the Department of Defense, it continues to leave a gap in coverage over
certain assaults that could be considered to violate the law of war. Cer-
tain assaults carrying maximum sentences of less than one year of im-
prisonment can constitute violations of the law of war depending upon
the circumstances of their commission, but are not included under the
MEJA. Putting aside the practical difficulties of using the MEJA, the
government should not be left without a means to pursue justice in the
courts in a case involving an assault by striking, beating, or wounding a
person entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions.
Congress should act now to fix the deficiencies that exist in the
body of federal law that allows for the prosecution of American citizens
who violate the law of war. Congress needs to fix the gap in the MEJA
that exists for crimes not carrying a punishment sufficient to trigger
application of the statute. This can be done in one of two ways. Pref-
erably, Congress should amend the MEJA to do away with the require-
ment that the offense carry a penalty of more than one year of impris-
onment if it were committed within the SMTJ. Alternatively, Congress
could increase the penalties for certain offenses to bring them within
the provisions of the MEJA.
Additionally, Congress should not allow the expansion of the juris-
diction of the UCMJ to remain on the books. Subjecting civilians to trial
by court-martial represents a serious infringement upon a citizen's con-
stitutional right to a grand jury proceeding and trial by one's peers. The
existence of an alternative means to prosecute by using a court-martial
will also detract from the continued refinement of the procedures for
using the MEJA as the primary means of prosecuting Americans working
in support of the Department of Defense for extraterritorial misconduct.
The burden of prosecuting American citizens, who more often than not
work alongside the military and not within a chain of command, should
fall upon the Department of Justice, not the military justice system.
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